

**IN THE HEARINGS AND MEDIATION GROUP OF
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF SINGAPORE
REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE**

Trade Mark No. T0812097B
Hearing date: 4 February 2014

**APPLICATION FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY PT EIGERINDO MULTI PRODUK INDUSTRI**

AND

**OBJECTION THERETO
BY SPORTS CONNECTION PTE LTD**

Assistant Registrar Diyanah Binte Baharudin
Decision date: 19 February 2014

Interlocutory hearing – application for cross-examination by Registered Proprietors in invalidation proceedings after they were deemed to have admitted to facts in the statutory declaration filed by the Applicants for Invalidation – objection by Applicants for Invalidation – whether cross-examination should be allowed

Relevant Facts

- i) PT Eigerindo Multi Produk Industri are the registered proprietors ("**Registered Proprietors**") of the mark  (T0812097B) for the following goods in Classes 18 and 25:

Class 18	Net bags for shopping, purses, rucksacks, school satchels, school bags, suitcases, travelling bags, umbrellas, vanity cases, wallets, wheeled shopping bags, lining of leather for shoes, bags for campers; all included in Class 18.
Class 25	Bandanas [neckerchiefs], bath sandals, bath slippers, beach clothes, beach shoes, belts [clothing], belts (money-)[clothing], boots, boots for sports, boots (iron fittings for-), boots (welts for-), braces for clothing [suspenders], cap peaks, caps [headwear], clothing, clothing for gymnastics, clothing of imitations of leather, clothing of leather, coats, coats (top-), cyclists' clothing, esparto shoes or sandals; fishing vests, fittings of metal for shoes and boots, football boots, football shoes, footwear, footwear (tips for-), footwear uppers, gaiters, gloves [clothing], gymnastic shoes, hats, headbands [clothing], headgear for wear, heelpieces for boots and shoes, heelpieces for stockings, heels, hoods [clothing], inner soles, jackets [clothing], jackets (stuff-) [clothing], jerseys [clothing], jumpers [shirt fronts], knitwear [clothing], lace boots, layettes [clothing], linen (body-)[garments], mittens, money belts [clothing], motorists' clothing, neckties, non-slipping devices for boots and shoes, outerclothing, overalls, overcoats, pajamas (Am.), pants, parkas, pullovers, pyjamas, ready-made clothing, ready-made linings [parts of clothing], sandals, scarves, shirt fronts, shirts yokes, shirts, shoes, shoes (iron fittings for-), shoes (non-slipping

	devices for-), shoes (welts for-), shoulder wraps, shower caps, ski boots, skirts, skull caps, slippers [undergarments], sock suspenders, socks, soles for footwear, sports (boots for-), sports jerseys, sports shoes, stocking suspenders, stockings, stockings (sweat-absorbent-), straps (gaiter-), studs for football boots [shoes], stuff jackets [clothing], suits (bathing-), sun visors, sweat-absorbent underclothing [underwear], sweaters, swimsuits, Tee-shirts, tips for footwear, trouser straps, trousers, trunks (bathing-), underclothing, underclothing (anti-sweat-), underpants, underwear, uniforms, vests, vests (fishing-), visors [hatmaking], waistcoats, waterproof clothing; all included in Class 25.
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- ii) Sports Connection Pte Ltd, the applicant for invalidation ("**Applicants**"), filed an application for a declaration of invalidity on 26 May 2011. The Applicants are registered



proprietors of another trade mark, (T8905544J), in respect of the following goods in Class 18:

Class 18	Bags covered in Class 18
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- iii) Given that the application for a declaration of invalidity was filed on 26 May 2011, the Registered Proprietors' counter-statement was due to be filed on 26 July 2011, in accordance with the Trade Marks Rules (Cap. 332, Rule 1, Rev. Ed. 2008) (hereinafter, "**TMR**"). An extension of time to file the counter-statement was sought by the Registered Proprietors and granted by the Registrar until 26 September 2011. However, no counter-statement was filed by 26 September 2011 or to-date. Pursuant to an interlocutory application by the Applicants, the Registrar affirmed that the invalidation proceedings could proceed despite the lack of a counter-statement, in accordance with Rule 58 of the TMR. The Applicants applied to the High Court for judicial review of this decision, but later discontinued the High Court proceedings. The invalidation proceedings at IPOS resumed on or about 1 June 2012.
- iv) On 3 August 2012 the Applicants filed their statutory declaration (the "**Applicants' SD**"). The Registered Proprietors' statutory declaration was thus due on 3 October 2012, in accordance with Rule 33(1) read with Rule 59(1) of the TMR. However, no evidence was filed by the Registered Proprietors by 3 October 2012 or to-date. On 12 October 2012, IPOS issued a letter informing parties that the Registered Proprietors were deemed to have admitted to the facts alleged by the Applicants in their application for invalidation, in accordance with Rule 33(3) read with Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR.
- v) The Registered Proprietors requested for an extension of time to file their statutory declaration on 12 October 2012, 7 working days after the deadline of 3 October 2012. An interlocutory hearing was held on 19 December 2012 in this regard. Given the facts of the matter, the Registrar directed that parties were to consider continuing negotiations to resolve this issue. The Registrar highlighted that the Applicants could still consent to the Registered Proprietors' request for an extension of time, after which the Registrar could make a decision on the issue. However, the Applicants refused to give such consent. On 19 March 2013 the Registrar refused the application for an extension of time and in accordance with Rule 33(3) read with Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR, the Registered

Proprietors were deemed to admit to the facts alleged by the Applicants in the Applicants' SD.

- vi) Between 17 April 2013 and 10 October 2013 parties engaged in negotiations, which eventually broke down. On 30 October 2013, both parties attended a Pre-Hearing Review held before the Registrar. The Registered Proprietors indicated, for the first time in the invalidation proceedings, that they wished to cross-examine the deponent of the Applicants' SD during the hearing. The Registrar allowed the Registered Proprietors leave to file an application for such cross-examination. On 13 November 2013, the Registered Proprietors filed their written submissions and bundle of authorities. The Applicants filed their written submissions and bundle of authorities in reply on 27 November 2013. Pursuant to the Applicants' request, a hearing was convened on 4 February 2014.

Registered Proprietors' submissions

- vii) The Registered Proprietors submitted that notwithstanding Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR, the Registrar has the discretion to require that facts that are deemed admitted need to be proved, by virtue of Section 60(2) of the Evidence Act (Cap. 97) ("EA").
- viii) They referred to Rule 69(3) of the TMR and submitted that the Registrar "shall" allow any witness to be cross-examined on his statutory declaration.
- ix) The Registered Proprietors submitted that they do not agree to the facts in the Applicants' SD but have merely been treated as having admitted to the facts by the rules of procedure. The Registrar has the power to require that these admitted facts be proved otherwise than by admission. Under Rule 69(3), the failure to file a statutory declaration is not fatal and the Registrar has the power to require that the Registered Proprietors give oral evidence in lieu of a statutory declaration. Reference was made to the nature and consequences of a procedural error under Order 2 Rule 1 of the Rules of Court. The Registered Proprietors submit that they should not be penalized for a mere procedural error in failing to file its statutory declaration. They would suffer substantial prejudice in the event of an appeal because the appellate court would not go behind the Registrar's findings of fact save in exceptional circumstances. No authorities were tendered on this particular point.
- x) At the hearing, the Registered Proprietors submitted that there should be a distinction between a formal admission and an admission by virtue of the application of rules of procedure, although no supporting authorities were tendered in support of this proposition. The Registered Proprietors submitted that the rule in Section 60(2) of the EA was meant to address the present situation, where a fact should be proved otherwise than by such admissions.
- xi) The Registered Proprietors added at the hearing that as a general rule, the court should err on the side of allowing more evidence, citing the case of ***Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others*** [2010] 3 SLR 110 ("***Basil Anthony***"), which was tendered to the Registrar on 7 February 2014, pursuant to directions given at the hearing.

Applicants' Submissions

- xii) The Applicants submit that the effect of a deemed admission under Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR is that there is no dispute between the parties as to the Applicants' evidence. Therefore, to allow the Registered Proprietors to cross-examine the Applicants' witness would be to render the operation of Rule 59(2)(d) otiose. The Applicants submit that the effect of a deemed admission is that statements of a factual nature submitted by the Applicants in his application are not disputed, following the IPOS case of *Morton's of Chicago Inc v Lone Star Restaurants Limited* [2011] SGIPOS 2 ("*Morton's*").
- xiii) Should the Registered Proprietors be allowed to give oral evidence in lieu of a statutory declaration, this oral evidence cannot be inconsistent with the deemed admissions made by operation of Rule 59(2)(d) in any event, and should therefore not be allowed. There would also be a lack of procedural fairness to the Applicants if the cross-examination of their witness is allowed, because they would not have the opportunity to cross-examine the Registered Proprietors' witness in turn, since the Registered Proprietors essentially do not have any witness, not having filed any statutory declaration.
- xiv) Section 60(2) of the EA is qualified by Section 60(1) of the EA. The sub-sections, when read together, show that the starting position is that facts admitted need not be proved, but that the court has the discretion to require admitted facts to be proved otherwise than by admission. Section 60 of the EA does not stipulate that facts admitted must be proved by cross-examination. The Applicants submitted that, during the interlocutory hearing on 19 December 2012 (see paragraph (v) above), the Registrar had in fact already applied his mind to the question of whether the facts in the Applicants' SD needed to be proved other than by deemed admission per Rule 33(3) read with Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR. In deciding that the extension of time for the filing of the Registered Proprietors' SD should not be allowed, the Registrar essentially decided that the facts did not need to be proved otherwise.
- xv) No substantial prejudice would be done to the Registered Proprietors even if they are not granted leave to cross-examine, because it is the substantive hearing of the merits of the invalidation proceedings that would determine the outcome of the case, citing *Morton's* in support of this proposition. In any event, the Applicants submitted at the hearing that it is not sufficient to argue that there would be prejudice if their application was not granted, especially since the prejudice that would be caused is a direct consequence of the Registered Proprietors' own default. The Applicants cited the case of *V Hotel Pte Ltd v Jelco Properties Pte Ltd* [2014] SGIPOS 1 in support of this proposition.
- xvi) The Applicants disagreed with the Registered Proprietors' submission that there should be a distinction between a formal admission and an admission by virtue of the application of the rules of procedure, submitting that there should be no difference between the two types of admission. Section 60 of the EA would apply regardless of what type of admission was made. The only situation in which the court would use Section 60(2) of the EA is where there is suspicion that the admission was not freely made. The Registered Proprietors tendered an extract from Jeffrey Pinsler's *Evidence and the Litigation Process* (3rd edition) in support of this submission. In reply to this, the Registered Proprietors submitted that their admission was not "freely made" because it was only made by operation of the rules of procedure. The Registered Proprietors then offered to limit their cross-examination to only certain issues and

offered to notify the Registrar and the Applicants of this list of issues prior to the hearing. However, the Applicants rejected this offer, stating that any cross-examination would allow the Registered Proprietors to do what they sought to do in the first place.

Held, allowing the Registered Proprietors' application to cross-examine the Applicants' witness on his evidence in part

1. The present matter involves the balancing of two competing considerations, *viz*, the need to meet parties' legitimate expectations that IPOS' rules of procedure will be applied strictly and the need to ensure that the application of such rules do not unduly restrict the objective of having the best available evidence at the full hearing before IPOS. In particular, the issue is whether the Registrar has discretion to allow cross-examination upon request by a party, and if so, whether the Registrar should exercise such discretion in this case, where another rule of evidence (Sections 33(3) read with Section 59(2)(d) of the TMR) provides that the consequence of a failure to file evidence is that the Applicants' evidence is deemed to be admitted.
2. In general, the Registrar has the discretion whether to allow cross-examination in IPOS proceedings, although use of the word "shall" in Rule 69(3) of the TMR suggests that more often than not, the Registrar will allow such cross-examination. Rule 69(3) of the TMR reads:

Evidence in proceedings before Registrar

69.—(3) The Registrar may, in any particular case, take oral evidence in lieu of or in addition to a statutory declaration *and shall, unless the Registrar otherwise directs, allow any witness to be cross-examined on his statutory declaration or oral evidence.* (Emphasis added)

3. The EA takes a more decisive position. Section 140(1) of the EA provides that

Order of examinations and direction of re-examination

140.—(1) Witnesses shall be first examined-in-chief, then, *if the adverse party so desires, cross-examined*, then, if the party calling them so desires, re-examined. (Emphasis added)

4. Generally, all witnesses who have given evidence are liable to be cross-examined, although the process of cross-examination is only undertaken if there is a purpose in doing so: Jeffrey Pinsler on *Evidence and the Litigation Process (4th edition)* (LexisNexis 2013) ("*Pinsler 2013*") at p 776-7, [20.002].
5. In the present proceedings, the Registered Proprietors are seeking cross-examination of the Applicants' deponent on the facts in the Applicants' SD although the operation of the rule of evidence in Rule 33(3) and Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR provide that they are deemed to have admitted to the facts alleged in the revocation proceedings. The relevant rules are:

Evidence in support of application

33.—(1) Within 2 months from the date of receipt by the applicant of the copy of the opponent's statutory declaration referred to in [rule 32](#), the applicant shall file with the Registrar a statutory declaration setting out the evidence he wishes to adduce in support of his application.

...

(3) If the applicant fails to comply with [paragraph \(1\)](#) or [\(2\)](#), he shall be treated as having withdrawn his application.

6. Rule 59(2)(d) provides that, for invalidation matters, the following applies:

Further procedure

59.

...

(d) the reference in [rule 33\(3\)](#) to the withdrawal of the application *shall be treated as a reference to the admission by the proprietor to the facts alleged by the applicant in his application for revocation or a declaration of invalidity of the registration*. (Emphasis added)

7. It is not disputed by the parties that the effect of these two rules (ie. Rule 33(3) read with Rule 59(2)(d)) is that the Registered Proprietors have made a "deemed admission." As noted by the Registrar in *Morton's* at [12], a deemed admission "simply means that all statements of a factual nature submitted by the Applicants in his application are not disputed [by the Registered Proprietor]."
8. However, the present case may be distinguished from *Morton's*. In *Morton's*, the Registered Proprietors did not appear to be represented nor did they personally participate in IPOS proceedings before the Registrar. The fact that they did not file their evidence was not in dispute. It was in these circumstances that the Registrar concluded that the deemed admissions were not disputed by the Registered Proprietors. In the present case the Registered Proprietors are not only represented by counsel, but have applied for leave to cross-examine the Applicants' evidence and have specifically objected to the Applicants' evidence. The application of Rule 33(3) and Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR, whilst a default consequence of the Registered Proprietors' conduct, is incongruous with the Registered Proprietors' true position in this case. I agree that a strict application of Rule 33(3) read with Rule 59(2)(d) is warranted where there is complete silence by the defaulting party, as in the case of *Morton's*. Such procedural rules would then allow the matter to proceed without delay. For avoidance of doubt, *Morton's* is still good law on this point.
9. The ultimate objective of IPOS proceedings is to ensure that a fair outcome is achieved using fair processes. The Court of Appeal in *Basil Anthony* held at [26] that
- ...in striking the proper balance between the general right and the specific limits, a trial judge must not only be guided by the applicable rules and decisions, **but must look beyond the mechanical application of these rules and decisions, and carefully assess the interests at stake in every case to ensure that a fair outcome is reached through the application of fair processes**. (Emphasis added)
10. The UK Court of Appeal echoed this position in relation to cross-examination in the Trade Marks Registry, in the case of *Kidax Ltd's Application* [1959] RPC 167, where Lord Evershed MR held that

For my part, I confess I would have thought that in such circumstances [ie. in the Trade Marks Registry] that **it is only consonant with the general principles upon which we [the Court of Appeal] administer justice here that if a party desires to test the evidence which appears by affidavit or statutory declaration, then *prima facie* and within reason he should certainly be allowed to do so.** (Emphasis added)

11. This case was cited by *PERMO Trade Mark in the Trade Marks Registry*[1985] RPC 597, where the applicants in an invalidation proceeding applied for leave to cross-examine the managing director of the registered proprietors at the main hearing on his statutory declaration. The application was allowed because of the Registrar's view that the evidence put forward by the managing director "could very readily give rise to further questions" and that such questions were "quite fundamental to whether use is going to be established or not" (at p 599). In this case, however, there was no operative rule of evidence that applied such that the registered proprietors' evidence was "deemed admitted".
12. In the present case, the Applicants have sought invalidation of the Registered Proprietors' marks under Section 8(2)(b), Section 8(4)(b)(i), Section 8(7)(a) and Section 7(6) of the Trade Marks Act ("TMA"). In particular, Section 7(6) of the TMA pertains to allegations of bad faith by the Registered Proprietors. The Applicants allege that they have made contact with one Ronny Lukito and had sent samples of their goods to him back in the early 1990s (see [18], Applicants' Grounds of Invalidation dated 26 May 2011). This contention is supplemented by the Applicants' SD dated 2 August 2012, where the following is stated:
 21. The Applicant's first direct encounter with the Proprietor was when I [the Applicants' deponent] met with a representative of the Proprietor in 1992 in Singapore. I recall now that his name is "Dody". At that time Dody was promoting "EXSPORTS" bags at an Indonesian trade fair "MADE IN INDONESIA" which was held at the Singapore World Trade Centre.
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 23. Sometime after our first meeting in Singapore, I went to Bandung to meet with Dody and to see the Proprietor's factory in Bandung. During that second meeting, I also passed to Dody about 5-6 pieces of the Applicant's "BODYPAC" bags for his quotation and sample production.
 24. Eventually, I did receive the replicated samples and quotation for manufacturing the bags. However, I considered that the quotations were too high and the quality of the replicated samples was not acceptable to me. Consequently, the parties' discussions for potential business collaborations ended there.
 25. Both parties did not return the samples to each other as it was too troublesome and additional cost was involved for shipping. Since that time, I have not met or had any contact with the Proprietor.
 26. As close to twenty (20) years have elapsed since my visit to Bandung, I am unable to locate my passport to evidence my trip to Bandung, nor any documentary evidence of the Proprietor's delivery of the bag samples and quotation to me.

13. These facts alleged by the Applicants could very readily give rise to further questions, especially in view of the fact that the Applicants do not have any documentary evidence to prove the same. I further note that an allegation of bad faith is a serious claim to make and it must be sufficiently supported by the evidence: see the decision of the Court of Appeal in *Valentino Globe BV v Pacific Rim Industries Inc* [2010] 2 SLR 1203 at 1215-6. The examination of this issue is fundamental to the issue of bad faith which the Applicants have pleaded in their Grounds of Invalidation. Cross-examination by the Registered Proprietors on this point is likely to assist the final adjudication of the substantive issues in the invalidation proceedings.
14. However, the rest of the Applicants' SD includes the Applicants' position as to the chronology of events, background of the Applicants' own trade mark, their sales, advertising and promotion figures, their distribution networks in Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as details on the successful assertion of their rights against third parties. These are matters that are within the Applicants' knowledge. The Registered Proprietors have missed out on their opportunity to put across their version of facts and events due to earlier procedural defaults. They cannot now seek to reopen these issues by way of cross-examination on these issues.
15. I now turn to address some of parties' submissions, on Section 60 of the EA as well as the Applicants' submission that the Registered Proprietors would effectively be given a second bite at the cherry if this application were to be allowed.
16. Section 60 of the EA provides that

Facts admitted need not be proved

60.—(1) No fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the hearing or which before the hearing they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings.

(2) The court may, in its discretion, require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.

17. Section 60 of the EA pertains to "formal admissions", which are described by Pinsler 2013 at p 403, [11.005] as follows

Section 60 of the EA and s 267 of the CPC provide that facts may be formally admitted prior to or at trial, in which case they are regarded as proved. Such admissions occur more often in civil proceedings, particularly in the course of pleadings. For example, the defendant, who is facing a suit for negligence in a traffic accident, may admit in his defence that he did collide with the defendant's car but deny that he was negligent. In another case, he may admit to the existence of a contract between him and the plaintiff and to the terms alleged by the plaintiff but deny that he failed to perform his obligations...

18. In the present case, it is not so clear that the Registered Proprietors' "deemed admission" under Rule 33 read with Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR is the same as a "formal admission" as envisaged under Section 60 of the EA. There must be a difference between an admission that operates automatically as a rule of evidence and an admission that is deliberately mentioned in a formal court document such as pleadings or in written correspondence between parties.
19. I now address the Applicants' submission on the effect of allowing the present application, listed in greater detail at paragraphs (xii) and (xiii) above. Whilst there is some merit to the submission that the application of Rule 33(3) and Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR will be rendered otiose, these rules must be read in tandem with the nature of the Registrar's discretion in Rule 69 of the TMR on evidence, as well as the particular facts and circumstances of the case. Here, denying the Registered Proprietors' request for cross-examination deprives the tribunal (IPOS) of the opportunity for the evidence on which the Applicants' allegation of bad faith is based to be tested. Unlike the scenario in *Morton's*, where the Registered Proprietors were completely silent (and unrepresented) throughout the entire proceedings, the reality in this case is that the Registered Proprietors are represented and have made their objections known to the Registrar, although they have virtually no other documents filed in the present proceedings (ie. no counter-statement, no statutory declaration) that describe their defence to the present application for invalidation, due to a series of procedural defaults.
20. In my assessment, given the present situation, the Registrar will benefit from having cross-examination of certain parts of the Applicants' SD and this will ultimately enable IPOS to come to a measured and fair decision at the final substantive hearing of the invalidation matter. The Applicants argued that it would be unfair for the Registered Proprietors to be allowed to cross-examine their witness whilst they are not able to cross-examine the Registered Proprietors' witness. However, Rule 69(3) of the TMR only allows cross-examination "on his statutory declaration or oral evidence." In the present case, the Registered Proprietors do not have any such statutory declaration, neither have they made any formal application to adduce oral evidence in lieu of the same.
21. The Applicants' point that the Registered Proprietors should not be allowed to contradict anything in the Applicants' SD is related to the point that to allow cross-examination is to render Rule 33(3) and Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR otiose. The Applicants can control the possibility of the Registered Proprietors being able to adduce new or further evidence through cross-examination simply by objecting to the inclusion of such evidence, if any, during the course of the substantive hearing of the matter. The objective of allowing cross-examination only in relation to certain paragraphs pertaining to the Applicants' allegations of bad faith is for this particular portion of the evidence to be tested, given the high threshold required to prove bad faith. I also note that the deponent of the Applicants' SD is a Singaporean citizen with a business in Singapore, and he should not be unduly inconvenienced by having to attend the substantive hearing at IPOS.
22. I turn to address the point that it is the Registered Proprietors' own default that resulted in them being deemed to have admitted to the facts in the Applicants' SD. Whilst the party in default cannot rely on its own default as a type of prejudice to himself, at the end of the day, the Registrar will have to consider the question of prejudice with a view to balancing both parties' competing interests and decide based on the justice of the case – see the Court of Appeal's dicta in *Sun Jin Engineering Pte Ltd v Hwang Jae Woo* [2011] 2 SLR

196 at [30], cited in *Tilaknagar Industries Ltd v Distileerderij En Likburstokerij Herman Jansen BV* [2013] SGIPOS 3 at [15]. In view of the serious nature of the bad faith claim, the prejudice to the Registered Proprietors justifies the exercise of the Registrar's discretion to allow cross-examination in this regard.

23. It is important to note that the present decision should not set a precedent for future cases and should be confined strictly to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It will be rare that cross-examination will be allowed after the default application of Rule 33(3) and Rule 59(2)(d) of the TMR.
24. By reason of the foregoing, the Registered Proprietors' application for leave to cross-examine the Applicants' witness on his evidence is allowed in part. Cross-examination is limited to paragraphs 21, 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Applicants' SD.

Legislation discussed:

Evidence Act (Cap. 97) Section 60, 140

Trade Marks Rules (Cap 332, Rev. Ed. 2008), Rule 33, Rule 59, 69

Trade Marks Act (Cap 332) Section 7(6)

Cases referred to:

Morton's of Chicago Inc v Lone Star Restaurants Limited [2011] SGIPOS 2

Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd and others [2010] 3 SLR 110

Kidax Ltd's Application [1959] RPC 167

PERMO Trade Mark [1985] RPC 597

Valentino Globe BV v Pacific Rim Industries Inc [2010] 2 SLR 1203

Sun Jin Engineering Pte Ltd v Hwang Jae Woo [2011] 2 SLR 196

Tilaknagar Industries Ltd v Distileerderij En Likburstokerij Herman Jansen BV [2013] SGIPOS 3

Representation:

Mr Ee Hock Hoe Adrian (Ramdas & Wong) for the Registered Proprietors
Mr Jinesh Lalwani (ATMD Bird & Bird LLP) for the Applicants